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The British Press and European Integration - 1948 to 1996. 
 
George Wilkes and Dominic Wring 
 
      Between 1948 and 1975, the British press moved from a vaguely 
'pro-Community' consensus to a pronounced and nearly unanimous Euro-
enthusiasm. Gradually this give way to widespread Euroscepticism in 
large sections of the press in the 1990s. 
 
      The initial pro-Community stance of the press was not simply 
due to the influence of an economic or political elite on editorial 
policy, through media magnates or politicians. Nor do the 
international contacts of the media explain the professedly 
independent approach of the pro-Community press. Beneath their 
increasingly strident campaign in favour of EC membership, 
journalists and editors in much of the pro-Community media betrayed 
an underlying uncertainty over the benefits of committing the UK to 
European institutions and policies. 'Pro-Communityism' during this 
period often related as much to a desire for domestic political 
change as it did to a favourable outlook on developments in the rest 
of Western Europe. By taking a stand in favour of entry into Europe, 
the press was cutting a profile for itself in domestic politics. 
This meant that, not only did the focus of editors on domestic 
debate frequently relegate events elsewhere to a minor position in 
coverage of the issue, but also that the British media was often 
blind to what was really happening across the Channel. 
 
 
Western Union and the creation of the European Movement, 1948 
      In 1948, the creation of the European Movement and the first 
speeches in favour of Western European unity of Ernest Bevin,  
Labour’s Foreign Secretary, prompted the first press debate over the 
merits of European co-operation. With the notable exceptions of 
Beaverbrook's Daily Express, devoted to an empire-oriented foreign 
policy, and the trade union-owned Daily Herald, chiefly concerned 
with the Labour government's economic freedom to act, most national 
newspapers and weekly magazines favoured the UK giving a lead in 
uniting Western Europe in the face of the Soviet threat.  
      Agreement stopped there. The Observer, edited by a federalist, 
David Astor, supported economic, political and military integration 
in Europe, largely in view of the potential threat of a German 
revanche. Its coverage of the founding congress of the European 
Movement at The Hague, stressed the federalist influence among 
British Labour delegates there and declared Winston Churchill's 
speech in support of a European Assembly his greatest ever. The News 
Chronicle, owned by a leading pro-Community activist, Lord Layton, 
was the only other publication which solidly supported the Hague 
initiative. Coverage in the centre-left Manchester Guardian was far 
less substantial, reflecting the editors' dislike for ambitious and 
'divisive' federalist schemes and for the party political point-
scoring which had accompanied Labour and Conservative proposals. The 
Financial Times largely ignored the political aspects of the 
European issue and gave scant attention to the economic aspects of 
the Western Union and Hague Congress proposals. The Times, though 
consistently anti-federalist, was otherwise unpredictable. Its 
editorials on 3 and 4 May praised Bevin for uniting parliamentarians 
behind a 'pragmatic' approach, 'organic, practical and developing 
always as needs require,' but were critical of Labour's 
'isolationist' ban on its MPs attending the Hague Congress. 
Thereafter, its scorn for federalists was turned against supporters 
of the Congress, attacking preparations for the Congress as 
unpractical, though backing its declaration on human rights; Labour 
were now criticized for being both too federalist and too dogmatic 
to co-operate with non-socialists. A leader on 8 May welcomed the 
fact that Churchill's approach to a European assembly was 'vague', 
while coverage of Congress proceedings in the days which followed 
focused on criticism of its federalist elements.  
 
      However, the leading weekly journals began to treat the 
European issue regularly and in more depth than the dailies, paying 
less attention to the domestic politics which surrounded the Hague 
Congress or Western Union initiatives. Leaders in the New Statesman 
attacked the supranationalist plans of The Observer, stressing the 
need for British-led European unity in the face of US and Soviet 
domination; arguing that economic unity, mixing trade liberalisation 
with economic planning, appeared more hopeful than political unity 
across the Roman Catholic-Socialist divide.The Economist, critical 
of federalism as utopian and cautious about European co-operation 
reversing American involvement in Europe, urged Bevin to be specific 
about what sacrifices of sovereignty he would make. The Hague 
Congress, according to an Economist editorial on 15 May, was 
'unrepresentative', and had failed to address the main 'practical' 
questions: Germany's place in Europe and interstate co-operation. It 
nevertheless noted with interest that an assembly might become a 
'European opposition'.  
 
      Though it is difficult to know what effect press support for 
European unification had on the UK government, a Foreign Office 
cabinet paper in November did take note of 'pressure' from 'sections 
of public opinion in this country' to make the proposals for 
'Western Union' more concrete, and used this as a partial 
justification for increasing European co-operation(Public Records 
Office, 1948). 
 
 
The Schuman declaration, May 1950. 
      Editorial reactions to the French initiative of 1950 to create 
a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) suggest that British 
journalists were now more open to a Continental initiative than they 
had been two years earlier. The Herald and Express remained 
implacably opposed to closer ties to the Continent, but most of the 
press welcomed the Schuman initiative, in spite of the difficulties 
which it presented for the UK. The Manchester Guardian noted that 
the Schuman Plan had 'exhilarating possibilities', suggesting that 
there were enough grounds for the UK to look 'fully and frankly' at 
membership despite the differences which marked it off from its 
Continental neighbours; The Times and the Daily Telegraph reached a 
similar conclusion. The Financial Times gave it little attention, 
but emphatically approved the decision to start integration without 
the Americans and British. The Observer, giving the initiative even 
less coverage, urged UK membership of the European organisation as a 
step towards an Atlantic Union. The Economist, favouring UK 
participation in order to bolster its ability to plan its own 
economy, maintained that the plan would 'stand or fall' on its 
effects on links with the US, warning that Adenauer and other 
Europeans harboured 'neutralist' designs for the new Western 
European organisation. The New Statesman, declaring that Labour 
should lead a neutralist 'Third Force' Europe, balanced the risks of 
a 'reactionary' Western Union, dominated by cartels, with hopes for 
an independent Western Europe, bolstered by 'socialist safeguards'. 
The Schuman Plan, it believed, would dissipate pressure for a 
solution to the 'German problem' which left states sovereign and 
kept the possibility of German rearmament open.  Coverage in the New 
Statesman was clearly influenced by Maurice Edelman, a Labour 
delegate to the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly; mirroring 
his positive judgement of Schuman's initiative, it asserted that 
Britain could not afford to reject the plan. Its position reversed 
once it became clear that Britain would not join. There was a broad 
correlation between the shift of opinion against the Schuman Plan in 
parliamentary debate and in the press (Moon, 1985, pp.107-115); both 
seem likely to have been influenced by the pre-election political 
atmosphere. 
 
 
The Birth of the European Economic Community 1955-59. 
      The media took a considerable time to realise the significance 
of Britain's exclusion from the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Not until the collapse of the free trade area negotiations in 1958 
did the bulk of press begin to question the wisdom of the UK 
government's European policy. 
 
      Broadsheet newspapers such as The Times and Telegraph played 
down the significance of the Messina conference in early June 1955, 
and the popular press ignored it entirely (Moon, 1985, pp.152-53). 
This reaction was  in line with the consensus among diplomats and 
politicians from the Six and the US, believing a more 
supranationalist direction for Europe to have been thwarted, 
supposedly symbolised by the resignation of Jean Monnet  President 
of the ECSC. Later that month, a visit from the Dutch foreign 
minister, Beyen, received mixed responses from the broadsheets: the 
Telegraph stressed the importance of Britain's role in the recently-
modified Western European Union; the Financial Times noted that the 
apparent improvement in the Six's attitude to the UK was due to the 
knowledge that Britain had more to give than it would receive in 
terms of the 'most important' aspect, the proposed European atomic 
energy agency, or 'Euratom'. A handful of radio broadcasts were also 
dedicated to British relations with the Six at this time. 
      In February 1956, The Economist took an isolated stand in 
favour of Euratom. Although negotiations among the Six were not 
covered in depth in the British press, the signing of the EEC and 
Euratom treaties on 25 March 1957 prompted editorials in the 
broadsheets, and the News Chronicle also printed a supplement for 
the occasion. Newspaper coverage of the development of the UK's 
counter-initiatives from this time was just as weak. A New York 
Times article on a possible British political initiative to the Six 
was missed in the British press, and they entirely passed over 
subsequent diplomatic developments in the winter of 1956-57. 
Broadsheet, radio and television coverage of the free trade area 
plan increased gradually over 1956-57,i following the government's 
developing public position and giving little attention to growing 
backbench support for closer links with the Six.  
 
      By 1957 the tendency of the print media was to favour a 
European free trade area. The free trade area negotiations of 1957-
58 and the establishment of the European Free Trade Association in 
1959-60 provoked a greater level of news coverage on television and 
in the press.  In the quality newspapers the issue still provoked 
infrequent comment , while the tabloids with fewer European 
correspondents relied greatly on the more specialist publications,  
for background comment. One such specialist journal, The Economist, 
had been increasingly critical of the British government's approach 
to the negotiations, and though their collapse in late 1958 left The 
Times simply indignant at 'France the Wrecker', a few journalists 
suggested that the UK should consider entering the EEC.ii 
 
 
The first 'great debate' over entering the EEC, 1960-63 
      The British press launched its first serious debate over 
membership of the EEC in 1960. Until spring 1961, the increasingly 
pro-entry press was the main forum for public debate of the pros and 
cons of membership. Once the application was under way, television 
became a major medium for public debate over the issue, the coverage 
of news and discussion programmes being biased more towards entry 
than against it. By the autumn of 1962, the press was no longer the 
largely pro-entry influence it had been at the time of the decision 
to open negotiations, and the government turned to television to 
persuade the public of the wisdom of entering the EEC ( Wilkes, 
forthcoming). 
 
      The first publications to support entry in 1960 were those of 
the political centre ground which had already discussed the option 
in late 1958. Though their advocacy of the merits of entry remained 
qualified,iii they were less cautious about the need for change than 
pro-Conservative publications. Beaverbrook's papers, prompted by a 
government leak, began to attack the pro-entry case in mid-1960. By 
the summer of 1961, almost all of the press had taken sides, and the 
Mirror, its equally pro-entry sister paper the Herald (no longer 
linked to the trade unions) and the Express had launched 'campaigns' 
on the issue, stepping up the number of leader articles on Europe 
and regularly featuring polemical  pieces, clearly distinguished 
from news items.iv The main news and discussion programmes on 
television – including Panorama, Tonight and Gallery – only began 
regular coverage of the issue late in the spring of 1961. Political 
balance in broadcasting was carefully monitored by the political 
parties, but not by pro- or anti-entry campaigning groups, and at 
this stage coverage was often biased towards the case for entry by 
the lack of news items clearly unfavourable to an application, and 
the relatively small number of journalists and politicians publicly 
opposed to an application. 
 
      To some extent, most pro-entry publications still took their 
cue from the government as it began its ambivalent shift towards 
membership of the EEC in 1960. In 1961, contacts between the Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan, the minister responsible for relations 
with the EEC, Edward Heath, and and the editors of Cecil King’s 
papers, the Mirror and Herald, may have given encouragement to both 
parties in the pursuit of a clearer pro-entry position (Macmillan, 
1973, p.14; Edelman, 1965, p.165). The decisions of much of the 
press to strike a pro-entry line and the launching of the Mirror and 
Herald 'campaigns' were also influenced by relations with pro-entry 
politicians. The pro-entry lobbies in the parties and the press had 
similar approaches: entry into Europe meant the revitalisation of 
the UK economy.Significantly supporters of entry in both the press 
and parliament based their approach on shared sources of information 
on the issue, perhaps most influentially of all The Economist 
articles by Christopher Layton (Edwards, 1993, pp.923-4).
      The role of the pro-entry press in the government's approach 
to negotiations for entry into the EEC has  often been exaggerated. 
When the press were most solidly supportive, in mid-1961, the 
government was most cautious; when the press became less convinced, 
the government became more publicly enthusiastic. Increasingly, the 
Conservative government and party turned to television interviews 
and ministerial broadcasts in an attempt to attract popular support 
for its European policy, and plans were being developed for a more 
sustained public campaign in the event of a successful conclusion to 
negotiations. Macmillan made his first ministerial broadcast on the 
issue in January 1962, revealing the importance which he attached to 
it.  (ministerial broadcasts were not normally used for single 
issues), and in September he made a broadcast which was so 
unequivocally supportive of entry that the Labour leader, Hugh 
Gaitskell, felt forced to contest it  in similarly strong terms. In 
contrast with his diffident approach to informing parliament, Heath 
made a priority of giving television interviews during the 
negotiations. As the government became beset by political misfortune 
in mid-1962, the pro-entry bias of much of the Conservative press 
did not seem to be translating into loyal grass-roots support for 
the government. Macmillan made only the slightest attempt to 'woo' 
Beaverbrook, as he put it, knowing the personal attention 
Beaverbrook gave to anti-European coverage of the issue in the 
Express newspapers (Macmillan, 1973, p.33).v 
 
      Gaitskell's relationship with the press in the summer of 1962 
was more direct than Macmillan's. For instance, Alistair 
Hetherington, editor of The Guardian consciously followed Gaitskell, 
rejecting the attempts of a number of Conservative ministers to 
persuade him to continue to support the application (Hetherington 
Papers). Having come down clearly against Macmillan's application, 
Gaitskell discussed the issue with Beaverbrook, though with little 
evident result (Beaverbrook Papers; Donnelly Papers). 
 
      In the summer of 1962, during the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Conference and the party conferences, the Common Market 
application was the most frequently covered issue in press and 
broadcasting news. The early dominance of support for entry across 
the press and broadcasting spectrum had now waned, as objections to 
the terms agreed at Brussels appeared in The Observer and The Times 
as well as The Guardian. The Mirror and Herald, by contrast, 
remained forthright in their support for entry even after de 
Gaulle's veto in January 1963. The breakdown of negotiations, hailed 
by the Express with the headline 'Hallelujah!', was followed avidly 
by the 'serious' media in January, though the issue was already 
fading in the popular press. Soon afterwards the bulk of the media 
dropped the subject as they became absorbed in the implications of 
Gaitskell's death and the ensuing Labour leadership struggle.  
 
 
The Labour government's Application  
      Though Wilson's government also  made an EEC membership 
application, it maintained an uneasy relationship with the pro-entry 
Labour press throughout. The increasingly federalist Guardian and 
the Mirror had returned to pressing for entry while others, like the 
successor to the Herald, The Sun, tempered their support for joining 
the EEC with advocacy for Wilson's attempts at 'bridge-building' 
between the EEC and EFTA. In 1966, the generally pro-Community press 
opposed the tendency of the party leaders to play the European issue 
down in their election campaigning (Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, 
p.214); The Guardian and Financial Times were so optimistic as to 
insist that the French now actually wanted the UK to join the EEC. 
Against them, the Daily Express,  despite Lord Beaverbrook's death,  
almost alone continued to hold out a 'golden vision' of a greater 
Commonwealth association. Public opinion moved in favour of entry 
over 1964-66, though the role played by the pro-Community bias of 
the press in this is unclear (Butler & Stokes, 1969, pp.176-7 and 
225-7). Wilson continued to skirmish with the Mirror and the other 
enthusiastic pro-entry publications, which for their part doubted 
the sincerity of his conversion to the pro-entry case. Privately he 
claimed to have been influenced towards the pro-entry case by an 
article in The Economist in 1966, though one close colleague, George 
Wigg, believed Wilson was more concerned with avoiding a Cabinet 
crisis than with the merits of entry into the EEC (Wigg, 1972, 
p.339; Kitzinger, 1973, p.226 and p.280). 
 
Entry into the European Communities, 1970-73. 
      Media coverage of the debate over entering the EEC reached a 
new level of intensity in 1971 when it became clear that British 
membership was within reach. Again the debate was skewed: anti-
Marketeers believed the increasing media bias in favour of the EEC 
was created by pressure from pro-Europeanss and by the interests of 
certain newspaper proprietors. Uwe Kitzinger, a pro-Marketeer, has 
written of a natural tendency for journalists to support 'reasoned', 
'internationalist' argument against sentimental 'nationalism' and 
'simplistic' fears (Kitzinger, 1973, pp.70-2 and p.337ff). Both 
arguments have some validity, though the majority of journalists 
supported entry without pressure from outside, and their decisions 
were focused more on domestic politics than on developments within 
the EC itself. 
 
      Changes in the ownership of a number of publications underline 
the point that pro-Community bias was usually not simply a matter of 
directives sent down to journalists from above. For instance, there 
was no relaxation of the passion with which the Daily Mirror 
supported entry after it passed from King to Reed International, nor 
had The Sun become less pro-European. However, editorial policy in 
the Express did continue to be influenced more by its new 
proprietor, Sir Max Aitken, than most publications.  The 
Expressremained the main anti-European publication until the Commons 
voted for entry in October 1971, threatening to fight against a 
'Yes' vote.  But shortly afterwards Aitken wrote that the Express 
would accept the will of parliament a decision which meant that from 
now on the Express would fight for British interests within rather 
than against the EC (Express, 28 October to 4 November 1971; 
Kitzinger, 1973, p.345). The Spectator swung against an application 
in the autumn of 1970 under the influence both of its proprietor, 
Harry Creighton, and its editor, George Gale. Reacting to the 
signature of the Treaty of Accession in 1972, Gale declared The 
Spectator would reverse its policy again and become federalist – he 
left before the referendum campaign of 1975, however, and both The 
Spectator and his own programming on London Broadcasting Corporation 
(LBC) remained vigorously opposed to EEC membership (Kitzinger, 
1973, p.342). 
 
      The influence of politicians on the national dailies was less 
obvious than it had been in 1960-63. The leading anti-Community 
weeklies, however, were clearly linked (through Richard Crossman of 
the New Statesman, Patrick Cosgrave of The Spectator and via the 
Tribune group) to backbench politics, and the sympathy of The 
Economist for Labour’s Marketeers may well have been increased by 
the personal contacts provided by John Harris (Kitzinger, 1973, 
p.337-39). 
 
      Despite the attempts of broadcasters and of much of the press 
to achieve a balance in their reporting, the pro-Community lobby 
gained some advantage through its organised approach to media 
liaison, based on the 'media breakfasts' directed by the 
Conservatives' former Director of Publicity, Geoffrey Tucker. 
Against this, anti-Marketeers paid little attention to media 
liaison. This made reporting of the pro-Community lobby easier, and 
the media breakfasts also prompted Independent  Television News 
(ITN) (with a larger audience than any newspaper) to include regular 
information bulletins on various aspects of Britain’s  application 
(Kitzinger, 1973, p.196ff and p,237; Hollingsworth, 1986, p.46). 
However, not all broadcasting coverage favoured the entry case: the 
rules stipulating that 'balance' be calculated strictly according to 
political tendency rather than size of support also had the effect 
of exaggerating the importance of the political extremes (Kitzinger, 
1973, pp.70-2). 
 
      The 'pro-Community' bias of most of the press, both during the 
parliamentary debate of 1971 and the referendum debate of 1975, was 
partly tempered by the continued freedom given to the few firmly 
anti-Market journalists by many of the pro-Community newspapers 
(notably The Times, Financial Times, and Telegraph), and by their 
inclusion of occasional articles commissioned from anti-Marketeers, 
though in 1975 there were cases in which zealous editors on The 
Times and the Scotsman were accused of subverting both practices 
(Kitzinger, 1973, pp.337-9; Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, p.78; 
Hollingsworth, 1986, pp.46-9). Finally, the overwhelming domestic 
focus of the debate was as pronounced as it had been in 1960-63, 
that is,  biased towards the 'pro-Community' case (Kitzinger, 1973, 
p.336). 
The 1975 referendum. 
      In 1975, controversy over pro-Community bias in the press 
reached a climax. Not only was there a near-total dominance of 
editorial coverage  for the pro-Community case, but news coverage 
also followed the pro-Community strategy in emphasising personality 
over policy differences. To anti-Marketeers, the newspapers' clear 
pro-Community bias seemed to explain the shift of public opinion 
polls from opposition to entry in 1974 and to the widespread 
acquiescence signalled by the 'Yes' vote in the referendum – though 
there are a number of other factors which might help to explain the 
shift (Hollingsworth, 1986, p.50; Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, p.176). 
Television broadcasting authorities, on the other hand, had largely 
quelled doubts about the balance of their output over the European 
issue, providing a large proportion of voters with a more reliable 
source of information from which to make their judgement. 
 
      A pro-Community bias dominated much news coverage on the issue 
in the press. Throughout the period of campaigning preceding the 
referendum, the 'pro-Community' press focused on the personalities 
of the few leading anti-Marketeers. The focus on personality had 
always affected coverage of the anti-Market camp more than the pro-
Community camp, since a relatively small number of politicians 
dominated the anti-Market campaign, most of whom were prominent on 
the far left and right wings of their parties (Butler & Kitzinger, 
1976, p.194). Nevertheless, the focus on personality now went 
further than it had previously, various publications alleging that 
the purpose of the referendum had been to prevent  Tony Benn from 
dividing the Labour Party. Assailed by the Mirror as the 'Minister 
of Fear' for his gloomy prediction of the effect EEC membership 
would have, Benn was also portrayed by Conservative dailies as a 
dictatorial leftist, or, as the Evening News colourfully put it, 'a 
vampire, a fanatic and a bully’ (Hollingsworth, 1986, pp.47-50). 
 
      Editorial coverage of policy questions in the pro-Community 
press show that they were not simply camouflaging the case for entry 
in domestic politics, as anti-Marketeers suggested. Bemoaning the 
focus of the domestic political debate on jobs and food prices, 
broadsheets and tabloids alike insisted that EC membership was above 
all a political ideal, which most publications had supported for 
over a decade (Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, pp.214, 218 and 229ff). The 
press were generally critical of the government's decision to hold a 
referendum. So too were the rest of the pro-Community lobby, though 
– as Colin Seymour-Ure has noted – the press had its own reasons for 
opposing a referendum, naturally defensive of its political role as 
interpreter of popular opinion, and believing the European issue was 
too old and too complex for renewed public campaigning to be able to 
treat it satisfactorily (Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, p.214). 
 
      Broadcasters too approached the referendum aware that they had 
to tread a fine line between boring audiences with too much 
coverage, on the one hand, and providing too little information on 
the other (Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, p.190). The Government White 
Paper laying ground rules for the referendum established a 
consultative mechanism for ensuring balanced broadcasting coverage 
which increased the freedom of broadcasting authorities to determine 
their own approach. As a result, programming could balance the two 
sides of the debate with less need to balance the participation of 
partisans and parties in each item, and the result was generally 
approved by both pro- and anti-Marketeers (Butler & Kitzinger, 1976, 
pp.190-213). 
 
 
Into the 1980s: the Debates over Integration. 
      Prior to 1983 the declared scepticism of the Labour Party 
reflected a wider public debate on European integration centred on 
the issue of whether Britain ought to remain in the EEC. The press, 
overwhelmingly supportive of the Conservatives, tended to reinforce 
Prime Minister Thatcher's belief in the economic benefits of 
membership.  Whilst  pro-government journalists like George Gale  
advocated withdrawal, they tended to be undermined by more mundane 
newspaper criticisms of EEC policy on UK budget contributions, 
agricultural subsidies and fishing agreements. If anything the 
complexity of the subject and perceived public disinterest combined 
to keep the issue off the top of the agenda, as did the coverage 
given to what were deemed to be more salient political topics like 
the supposed power of trades unions, Labour left-wingers and the 
Soviet threat. 
 
      The Single European Act of 1986 opened a new era of co-
operation between Community partners.  Following the largely 
untroubled passage of the Act in each member state, integrationist 
thinkers came to the fore of public debate.  President of the 
European Commission and the former French Socialist minister Jacques 
Delors articulated a vision of closer union and mutual co-operation.  
Others, particularly Margaret Thatcher, were less impressed.  In her 
famous sceptical speech at Bruges in September 1988 Thatcher 
attacked the federalist position by arguing the Community should be 
nothing more than a partnership of trading states.  The Conservative 
press, which backed the prime minister in other matters, tended to 
agree.  Significantly they were joined by the Labour supporting 
Daily Mirror which sympathetically reported 'Thatcher scorns 
identikit Europe'(21 September 1988).  However, as the debate began 
to intensify during the late 1980s into something altogether more 
important, it was interesting that the prime minister saw it 
necessary to question whether Brussels based correspondents were in 
danger of going 'native' (Morgan, 1995). 
 
      Ironically it was an attack by populist tabloid The Sun which 
brought Jacques Delors and his vision of Europe to greater public 
attention in Britain.  Three weeks prior to the resignation of 
Thatcher, a move itself exacerbated by serious Conservative 
divisions over EC policy, the paper attacked Delors for being 'the 
most boring bureaucrat in Brussels' (The Sun 30 October 1990).  
Nevertheless, within a couple of days, the President was deemed 
sufficiently interesting to merit a frontpage story, which opened 
with the memorable headline 'Up Yours Delors!' and continued: 'The 
Sun today calls on its patriotic family of readers to tell the 
feelthy French to FROG OFF!' before ending by asking the public to 
collectively shout across the English Channel: 'At midday tomorrow 
Sun readers are urged to tell the French fool where to stuff his 
ECU’ (The Sun 1 November 1990).  More detailed analysis in the same 
edition attacked French farmers' burning of British livestock, 
'dodgy food' exports and even Napoleon Bonaparte.  Less tastefully, 
The Sun also questioned the country's record during the Second World 
war.  As Gertrude Hardt-Mautner points out this, the most infamous 
attack by a London based newspaper on an EC politician, is 
emblematic of a tendency on the part of the press to merge 
isolationist British pride with a fear that European integration 
threatens this in prejudiced reports attacking continental 
neighbours (Hardt-Mautner, 1995).  Nor is this tendency solely the 
domain of the popular tabloids, as a reporter on the Daily Telegraph 
showed when commenting on how a breakthrough in the building of the 
Channel Tunnel was enabling British people to smell ‘the first 
whiffs of garlic’ (31 October 1990). 
 
      Following the resignation of Margaret Thatcher from government 
in Novermber 1990, the press not to mention Conservative leadership 
have appeared less predictable in their European policy.  Warning of 
the problems inherent in the Maastricht Treaty, the Daily Telegraph 
was typical of much print media commentrary when it urged John Major 
and his government to exercise leadership by 'strapping the 
visionaries into their seats...to check the extremists and put the 
EC on a sane and realistic path for the future' (9 December 1991).  
The press' initial, grudging acceptance of the complex Maastricht 
settlement was partially revised in the autumn of 1992, following 
the debacle over Britain's forced withdrawal from the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism.  This event, popularly termed 'Black 
Wednesday', heightened   sensitivities to the integration question 
and provided obvious support to the accusation that, as the leading 
tabloid put it: 'The European dream is in tatters' (The Sun, 21 
September 1992). The following day an editorial in the same title 
declared it did not want to see a 'United States of Europe...run 
from Brussels' deciding policies on tax, immigration and the economy 
with recourse to a Central Bank (The Sun 22 September 1992).  A 
survey of ten readers, together with the inevitable phone-in poll 
that followed, backed the paper’s call for the government to ‘Tear 
up the Treaty’.  Reflecting print media divisions over party 
political matters, the press was not uniform in its response to the 
ERM crisis, and it was the Daily Mirror which defended the Community 
by arguing it had created ‘ever closer unity in Europe’ and been a 
force for stability and bulwark against war. 
 
 
‘Euromythology. 
      Apart from the serious concerns that further European 
integration might cost jobs and cede sovereignty, one tabloid 
journalist admitted his professions’ frame of reference was also 
governed by a view of an EC perceived to be 'interfering more and 
more in trivia' (Morgan, 1995).  Most obviously this perspective has 
manifested itself in a series of so-called 'Euromyth' reports.  
These arise because, as one correspondent put it, the 'British are 
overready to build on a little information'.  Coupled with the large 
amount of material available from various sources within the 
Community there has been obvious scope for misunderstandings and 
inaccuracies.  As The Sun (21 September 1994) put it, in one 
reknowned ’Euromyth’, 'Now They've Really Gone Bananas: Euro bosses 
ban "too bendy" ones and set up minimum shop size of 5 and a half 
inches'.  Features of this kind, together with a mass of other press 
reports about the EC’s intention to outlaw anything from British 
prawn cocktail crisps to the pound, were judged sufficiently harmful 
to merit a formal rebuttal by the government in the form of two 
Foreign Office booklets.   
 
      The FCO pamphlets The European Community: Facts and Fairytales 
(Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1993) and Facts and Fairytales 
Revisited (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1995) featured analysis of 
what were termed ‘euromyths’, ‘euroscares’ and ‘eurolunacies’.  
Interestingly the latter category, unlike the other two, did not 
support the sentiment that EU decisions and directives were always 
based on sound logic and common sense.  By contrast the more 
avowedly pro-Union pamphlets issued by the Commission itself, Do you 
believe all you read in the newspapers? (European Commission, 1994) 
and Do you still believe all you read in the newspapers? (European 
Commission, 1995), were unanimous in attacking what they saw as 
unfair reporting in the British press.  Perhaps surprisingly their 
list of offending titles included normally sympathetic journals The 
Guardian and The Independent alongside usual suspects like The Sun 
and Daily Star.  It would be wrong, however, to portray all press 
criticism of the EU as essentially trivial or superficial in nature 
and content.  In 1994, for instance, The Guardian challenged the 
Commission to make itself more accountable by allowing greater 
public access to documentary accounts of its procedures (Tumber, 
1995). 
 
      According to one Brussels based journalist, the 
'nationalistic' coverage apparent in much of the London based media 
derives from the fact that 'EU news still comes from British 
government sources' (Morgan, 1995).  This is perhaps strange, given 
the existence of Foreign Office booklets aimed at countering press 
misrepresentations of Community matters.  Arguably this reflects the 
complex, ongoing debate over integration.  Consequently whilst 
Downing Street has been keen to protect Britain’s trading 
partnership it is also conscious in asserting the national identity 
and independence of the country. 
 
Given recent moves toward greater political and economic integration 
amongst Britain’s Community partners it is perhaps inevitable that 
the Westminster government, comfortable with the non-federal status 
quo, has emitted mixed messages which vary according to given 
policies or circumstances.  Thus, where conflicts between London and 
Brussels have arisen, the eurosceptical press has unsurprisingly 
opted to follow the lead and promote the views of the former.  This 
bias is further compounded by an organisational culture evident in 
highly centralised states like France and Britain where journalists 
can regularly rely on one or two authoritative ministerial or civil 
service sources.  By comparison, what goes for an information policy 
amongst the diffuse body of interests that make-up the EU can 
alternate between the extremes of being, as one reporter described 
it, ‘naive’ or ‘Machiavellian’ (Morgan, 1995). 
 
      The fact that the media can help to inform public opinion and 
ultimately the different member states' policies on integration has 
been recognised within Brussels.  In particular the ongoing 
hostility of the British press and, perhaps more importantly, the 
initial rejection of Maastricht in the first Danish referendum on 
the Treaty [DATE] encouraged the Commission to reconsider how it 
might best promote the Union.  Consequently reports from marketing 
and other publicity specialists have been the subject of recent 
discussions (Tumber, 1995).  Accordingly EU officials are now taking 
greater care to service and monitor privately owned newspapers 
which, in a country with public service broadcasting like Britain, 
are often the source of the most flamboyant agenda-setting stories 
(Morgan, 1995).  This fact, together with the residual hostility of 
much print media, was amply demonstrated during 1996 in a 
controversy over a hitherto minor public concern to do with the 
safety of British beef. 
 
 
The ‘Beef War’ of 1996. 
      Ironically in its 1990 ‘Up Yours Delors!’ attack on the 
Commission President, The Sun cited a recent decision of the French 
government to ban imports of British beef as one of the factors 
motivating the paper’s strong editorial content.  Few at the time 
would have predicted that, by mid-1996, this issue would be at the 
centre of media debates over government policy on Europe.  The 
catalyst behind this development lay in a Department of Health 
statement issued by Secretary of State Stephen Dorrell in response 
to the appearance of a leaked memo in the Daily Mirror during the 
last week of March.  Having made public their concern over the 
safety of British beef, the government appeared to give credibility 
to the idea that there might be a link between BSE, the so-called 
‘mad cow disease’, and its human equivalent CJD.  The move triggered 
a crisis of confidence in British beef, culminating in a 
controversial decision by European Union member states to ban all 
imports of British beef and its derivatives.  As the British Medical 
Journal (30 March 1996) reported, the scientific complexities, 
public concerns and questions surrounding the wisdom of government 
agricultural and deregulation policies arising from the case, were 
soon sidelined in a media driven debate about European integration. 
 
      The Sun chose St.George's Day to offer its lengthiest response 
to the beef ban in the form of a frontpage editorial asking readers 
to act as 'EU THE JURY' (23 April 1996). The item attacked the Union 
as a 'beast...which aims to devour our national identity' and 'a 
very real dragon which threatens every single one of us throughout 
the United Kingdom.'  Unusually for The Sun the editorial continued 
inside on a full page complete with an illustration of a dragon 
which had also appeared on the front cover.  Declaring 'a thousand 
years of civilisation is being tossed away', the paper even alluded 
to George Orwell’s literary classic 1984 when it declared:  'We want 
to see free trade between friendly nations, a genuine Common Market, 
not an Orwellian superstate which blindly tries to make Germans like 
Britons, or Spaniards live like Irishmen.'  Interestingly the piece 
made sympathetic mention of the Referendum Party led by businessman 
and MEP Sir James Goldsmith.  Like Goldsmith's newly formed 
organisation, the paper and over 95 per cent of the 23,000 callers 
to a special Sun phone poll agreed that the government should 
organise a referendum on the desirability of further European 
integration. 
 
      Predictably the officially sanctioned ‘Europe Day’ triggered a 
hostile response from The Sun (9 May 1996).  By comparison with the 
editorial of the 23rd April, argument was substituted with abuse in 
a feature, entitled 'WE ATE EU', which went on to attack corruption, 
sleaze and the notion that British government buildings ought to fly 
the Union flag. These points were further reinforced by television 
critic Garry Bushell in his attack on European federalism: 'Stuff 
your Union, Jacques'.  Soundbites of assorted Eurosceptic MPs, all 
Conservative, were placed throughout the edition under the caption 
'Why I Hate EU.'  However it should be noted that the editorials in 
The Sun stopped considerably short of the call made by Lord Woodrow 
Wyatt in another News International title, The Times, for a complete 
British withdrawal from Europe (7 May 1996).  Rather, like other 
sceptical leaders in the Telegraph, Express and Mail, the papers’ 
commentaries tended to concentrate on the perceived loss of 
sovreignty rather than the issue of membership itself. 
 
      Arguably more of a revelation than editorials in The Sun were 
the equally passionate opinions articulated by the Daily Mirror.  
Declaring 'Britain needs EU', the paper developed its argument: 'If 
we ever cut ourselves loose from our partners across the Channel, we 
would become an isolated irrelevant island' (28 May 1996).  In 
reality the actual policy position of the paper, if more favourable 
to the idea of a European single currency, differed from that of The 
Sun in its tone rather than substance.  Indeed, professed Mirror 
enthusiasm for the European ideal did not prevent it from making 
what editor Piers Morgan later admitted was an error of judgement 
when his paper published the headline ‘Achtung Surrender!’ on 
hearing the England football team’s next Euro 96 semi-final 
opponents would be Germany (Daily Mirror 25 June 1996). 
 
      The debate over the media response to the beef ban created 
some odd alliances.  Whilst Chancellor and enthusiastic European 
Kenneth Clarke must have welcomed the pro-EU coverage in the Labour 
supporting Daily Mirror, he was clearly less well disposed to those 
newspapers critical of the Union.  Pointedly Clarke made explicit 
his view of the owners of what were once loyal Conservative titles 
when he admitted:  ‘Quite a lot of the press is owned by anti-
European people and they go to great lengths to try and and arouse 
prejudice in their readers to match that of their own political 
opinions’ (BBC Radio 4, 31 May 1996).  It is likely that, in making 
these comments, the Chancellor was venting his frustration at two 
well known non-European sceptics with extensive media interests: 
Rupert Murdoch, the Australian turned American owner of the News 
International Corporation, and the Canadian Conrad Black, proprietor 
of the Daily Telegraph, its Sunday sister paper and influential 
right-wing magazine The Spectator. 
 
      Predictably Jacques Santer, President of the European 
Commission, went further than Kenneth Clarke in expressing his 
concern about what he called the ‘anti-European propaganda, and even 
xenophobic propaganda, in the British press’ (BBC Radio 4, 31 May 
1996).  Similar sentiments informed the observations of a London 
based German journalist Ulrich Schilling: ‘The Sun, the Mail and 
Express are not harmless leaflets: they are read by 20 million 
people, and they may not all understand the special brand of humour 
which seasons Sun headlines’ (The Guardian 3 June 1996).  The 
combined activities of the press and Referendum Party were enough to 
prompt pro-Union MPs such as Edwina Currie and Peter Mandelson to 
consider a response which eventually took the form of a public 
relations’ offensive co-ordinated by the European Movement’s 
director of communications David Vigar (The Guardian 1 June 1996). 
 
      Following their varied attacks on the decision of European 
member states to ban imports of British beef, the print media focus 
eventually moved to assess the performance and role of the domestic 
government.  Particular attention was given to John Major.  
Following on from the broadly hostile comments made in normally 
loyal Conservative newspapers about the prime minister during the 
1995 Conservative leadership campaign, The Sun once again questioned 
the premier's judgement when it suggested he might be 'raising the 
white flag' in his dealings with Community partners. (23 April 1996)   
Major did eventually organise a government response to the beef ban 
which took the form of a general policy of non-cooperation with the 
EU.  If this move upset member states, it did manage to temporarily 
appease many of the more sceptical papers including the Daily Mail 
which declared 'Major Goes to War at Last', and the Daily Star, 
whose headline announced 'Eff EU lot blasts Major'.  For its part 
The Sun was fulsome in its praise for the strategy: ‘Britain said No 
to Europe yesterday- 12 times... Major must be strong.  There must 
be no wavering.  The people are behind him all the way on this one’ 
(29 May 1996). 
 
      From the beginning of the policy of non-cooperation, certain 
newspapers were less than praiseworthy about what they perceived to 
be an inadequate and potentially counter-productive government 
strategy for getting the beef ban lifted.  Predictably analysis of 
this kind appeared in non-Tory titles like The Guardian, The 
Independent and Daily Mirror.  Interestingly this line of argument 
was supported by the traditionally pro-Conservative Evening Standard 
and its editor Max Hastings.  Within a month these critics of the 
government's 'beef war' appeared to be vindicated when papers such 
as The Sun, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail and Daily Express all 
expressed disatisfaction with subsequent policy changes one of them 
denounced as amounting to little more than a 'cave in' (The Observer 
23 June 1996).   
 
      The impatience and ill-will towards Major resurfaced again in 
The Sun following the resignation of junior minister David 
Heathcoat-Amory on the European issue.  Declaring him a 'hero', an 
editorial supported the hitherto little known Conservative MP’s 
opposition to the single European currency by demanding 'Time you 
Major mind up' (The Sun 23 July 1996).  Accusing the prime minister 
of 'dithering and fudging', the newspaper made plain the depth of 
its displeasure: 'Major's policy of appeasing Europe, staging phoney 
wars that inevitably lead to surrender, is exposed as a sham'.  As 
former News International employee and Sunday Times editor Andrew 
Neil has since admitted, the opinions of The Sun tend to more 
accurately represent those of proprietor Rupert Murdoch than any of 
the other British newspapers he owns (Neil, 1996).  Put more simply 
Murdoch and his tabloids are eurosceptics, disrespect John Major and 
appear to have a high opinion of Tony Blair.  The European issue may 
have damaged more than just Conservative Party unity, it might also 
be in the process of breaking up what was once commonly termed the 
‘Tory press’. 
 
 
Conclusions. 
      The reversal of the trend towards Euro-enthusiasm in the 
British press developed gradually over the 1980s, affecting first 
the right-wing tabloids and then the Conservative broadsheets.  This 
was not an automatic corollary of the shift to Thatcherite economics 
or trade policy, as The Times, Telegraph, and The Economist, for 
instance, having taken up the crusade against 'state 
interventionism' continued to support the EEC on economic and 
increasingly on monetary grounds.  Nor was it simply a product of a 
'populist' media reaction to the apparent growth in the gulf between 
the main parties and the electorate, a factor which previously 
appeared to bolster the pro-EEC shift among the centrist press. It 
was certainly not an automatic reaction to having discovered upon 
entry what the Community was like.  
 
      Behind the growing press attacks on the Community there lay a 
combination of all of these factors.  Dramatic changes in 
Conservative and Labour positions over the UK’s role in Europe in 
the mid-1980s meant the right-wing press would now gain a domestic 
political premium from attacking the Community. The renewal of 
confidence among European federalists in the mid-1980s also gave the 
press more of a target to aim against.  Added to this was the 
problem of the print media as a ‘national’ gatekeeper: ‘The main 
problems for the EU is that, as Euro-scepticism grows, it is having 
to compete for publicity with national governments of Member States 
in a game still officiated by national media and particularly the 
national press.  At the moment it is still the EU which is receiving 
most of the yellow cards’ (Tumber, 1995).  Finally, the 1980s 
heralded a revolution in the production, ownership and marketing of 
the British press.  Competition, which had driven the press of the 
1960s and 1970s into an increasingly enthusiastic 'pro-Community' 
campaign, fed the appetite of broadsheets and tabloids for 
sensational 'scoops' and anti-European populism in the 1990s. 
 
 
References. 
BBC Written Archives Centre, Caversham. 
Beaverbrook Papers, House of Lords Library. 
Butler, D., and Kitzinger, U. (1976) (eds.),  
      The 1975 Referendum (London). 
Butler, D., and Stokes, D. (1969),  
      Political Change in Britain: Forces shaping  
      electoral choice (Harmondsworth). 
Camps, M. (1964),  
      Britain and the European Community, 1955-63   
      (Princeton). 
Desmond Donnelly Papers, National Library of Wales. 
Edelman, M. (1966),  
      The Mirror: a political history (London). 
Edwards, R. D. (1993),  
      The Pursuit of Reason: The Economist, 1843-1993  
      (London). 
European Commission (1994),  
      Do you believe all you read in the newspapers?  
      (London). 
European Commission (1995),  
      Do you STILL believe all you read in the  
      newspapers? (London). 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office (1993),  
      The European Community: Facts and Fairytales  
      (London). 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office (1995),  
      Facts and Fairytales Revisited (London). 
Hardt- Mautner, G. (1995),  
      ‘How does one become a good European?”: the  
      British press and European integration’,  
      Discourse & Society, 6: 177-205. 
Hetherington Papers, London School of Economics   
       Library. 
Hollingsworth, M. (1986),  
      The Press and Political Dissent: a question of  
      censorship (London). 
ITN Archives, London. 
Jenkins, C. (1990),  
      All Against the Collar: Struggles of a White  
      Collar Union Leader, (London). 
Kitzinger, U. (1973),  
      Diplomacy and Persuasion (London). 
Macmillan, H. (1973),  
      At the End of the Day, 1961-63 (London). 
Moon, J. (1985),  
      European Integration in British Politics, 1950- 
      63 (Aldershot). 
Morgan, D. (1995),  
      ‘British Media and European Union News’,   
      European Journal of Communication, 10: 321-343. 
Neil, A. (1996),  
      Full Disclosure, (Hampshire) 
Public Record Office, CAB 128/22, CM(48)68, 4.11.48. 
Taylor, G. (1993),  
      Changing Faces: A History of the Guardian,  
      1956-88 (London). 
Tumber, H. (1995),  
      ‘Marketing Management: the EU and news  
      management’, Media, Culture & Society, 17:  
      511-519. 
Wigg, Lord (1972),  
      George Wigg (London). 
Wilkes, G.,  
      ‘British attitudes to the European Community,  
      1956-63’, Ph.D thesis (Cambridge, forthcoming). 
      7567. 
                                                          
i For example, Independent Television News and Panorama began to 
devote more attention to relations with the Six in 1957 (see ITN 
archives; and BBC Written Archives). 
ii The Economist, Guardian and The Observer began to discuss 
joining the EEC, while economist and journalist Alan Day made the 
earliest broadcast appeals for entry on BBC radio, Dec. 1958 
(Camps, 1964, p.287). 
iii Those in favour of entry in 1960 included The Economist, The 
Observer, Mail, Spectator, Encounter, and Time & Tide. The 
Guardian maintained a positive outlook towards joining the EEC 
from January 1960, while insisting there was no hurry to decide. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Editorials in the Financial Times, The Times and the Telegraph 
also began to consider the merits of entry at this time. 
iv The continued balance of news items in the Express did 
contrast with the slant given to their headlines. Also in favour 
by June 1961: the Financial Times, Times, Telegraph, Guardian, 
Mirror, Herald, Scotsman, Statist, Sunday Times. Opposed: the 
Express newspapers (Daily and Sunday Express, Evening Standard), 
City Press, Daily Worker, Reynolds News, Sunday Citizen, New 
Statesman, Tribune, New Left Review.  
v Beaverbrook's personal interference in his papers' Common 
Market coverage is suggested by his correspondence with Peter 
Walker (Beaverbrook Papers) and from the testimony of Clive 
Jenkins (1990, p.130). 
